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ON TWO ALLEGED CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
DIVINE ATTRIBUTES 
Torin Alter 
Some argue that Cod's omnipotence and moral perfection prevent Him from 
being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understand ing such 
states-which contradicts His omniscience. But, I argue, He could acquire 
such understanding indirectlv, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of 
imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental 
states with which He could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces 
of such states. (i)-Oii) are consistent with the principal divine attributes. 
I wish to discuss two anti-theistic arguments, both of which use seemingly 
plausible empiricist principles to establish a conflict between divine attrib-
utes. One of the arguments, due to David Blumenfeld (1978), runs roughly 
as follows. An omniscient being would understand all concepts and all the 
facts of human psychology. But understanding fear, frustration, and despair 
requires having (at some time) mental states that no omnipotent and omni-
scient being could have, namely, fear, frustration, and despair. Therefore, 
no being could be both omniscient and omnipotent. The second argument, 
a variation of Blumenfeld's, runs roughly as follows. An omniscient being 
would know what it's like to have an evil desire. But such knowledge 
requires having an evil desire, which is incompatible with moral perfection. 
Therefore, no being could be both omniscient and morally perfect.1 On the 
traditional, Anselmian conception of God, on which God is by definition 
omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect-which I'll assume through-
out-it follows from either argument that He doesn't exist.2 
The empiricist principles employed in the two anti-theistic arguments, 
which impose experiential constraints on grasping certain mental states 
and associated concepts, have considerable prima facie appeal. Further, the 
principles may seem to gain support from influential arguments in the phi-
losophy of mind by Thomas Nagel (1974, 1986) and Frank Jackson (1982, 
1986), as I'll explain. But, I'll argue, the principles are false. Reasonable 
empiricists should concede that understanding the concepts of fear, frus-
tration, and despair doesn't require being afraid, frustrated, and desperate, 
and that understanding what it's like to have an evil desire doesn't require 
having an evil desire. God could acquire such understanding indirectly, 
either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imagi-
natively combining the components of mental states with which He could 
be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)-(iii) are 
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consistent with the principal divine attributes. 
In §1, I'll present the anti-theistic arguments in more detail. In §2, I'll 
explain why the empiricist principles on which they rely may seem to gain 
support from the Nagel-Jackson arguments. In §3, f'll argue that the 
empiricist principles are false. In §4, I'll address the concern that my argu-
ments assume too much similarity between God's mind and our minds, 
and I'll summarize. 
1. The Alleged Conflicts 
Blumenfeld articulates the empiricist principle on which his argument 
relies as follows: 
for some concepts, in order fully to comprehend them, one must have 
had the experience of an instance or exemplification of them .... Take 
the concept of the sensation of red. Surely one could not fully grasp 
this notion if one had never had an experience of redness. 
(Blumenfeld 1978, p. 205) 
Blumenfeld claims that his empiricist principle extends to the concepts of 
fear, frustration, and despair, thus generating a conflict between omniscience 
and omnipotence. He argues that God couldn't have fear, frustration, or 
despair, since that would require having beliefs that He couldn't have: 
their occurrence depends logically on the subject's believing in the 
limitation of his power .... To experience fear, a person would have to 
believe that he was in danger, that he might somehow be harmed. If 
he did not in any sense believe this, then no sensation he was hav-
ing-no cold chill, no sinking feeling in the pit of the stomach-
would count as fear. One's experiences would be mere sensations-
and nothing more. Without the belief in danger, these states would 
have to be described in terms other than those which imply that the 
person is afraid. A similar account can be given of frustration and of 
despair. There could be no experience of frustration without the 
belief that one had been (was being, or might be) thwarted. There 
could be no sense of despair w1less a person faced a situation he took 
to be dire, and for which he believed he was very unlikely to find a 
remedy. (Blumenfeld 1978, pp. 206-7) 
Because of God's omnipotence and omniscience, He would realize that He 
is never in danger. Therefore, Blumenfeld concludes, He couldn't believe 
that He is in danger.' Since Blumenfeld maintains that being afraid requires 
believing that one is in danger, he infers that He couldn't be afraid. By his 
concept empiricism, it follows that He couldn't fully understand the con-
cept of fear or "[a]ny proposition involving this concept" (1978, p. 207). 
Since such understanding is implied by omniscience, he concludes that no 
being could be both omnipotent and omniscient, and thus that God doesn't 
exist. Parallel reasoning applies to despair, which is 'Iintimately tied to a 
belief in the hopelessness of one1s situation" (Blumenfeld 19781 p. 210), and 
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to frustration, for similar reasons. 
l3lumenfeld's argument may be summarized as follows: 
1. God must understand the concepts of fear, frustration, and 
despair. [Implication of God's omniscience] 
2. Such understanding requires (at some time) being afraid, frus-
trated, and desperate. [Application of empiricism to the concepts 
of fear, frustration, and despair] 
3. God couldn't be afraid, frustrated, or desperate. [Implication of 
Blumenfeld's belief requirement and God's omniscience and 
omnipotence] 
4. Therefore, God couldn't understand the concepts of fear, frustra-
tion, and despair. [From 2 and 3] 
5. Therefore, God doesn't exist. [From 1 and 4] 
The second anti-theistic argument concerns evil desires and moral per-
fection, and I'll henceforth call it the argument from evil desires. It runs as fol-
lows. An omniscient being would know everything about human psychol-
ogy, including what it's like to have evil desires. Such knowledge requires 
having an evil desire. Having an evil desire is incompatible with moral 
perfection. Therefore, no being could be both omniscient and morally per-
fect, and thus God doesn't exist.' In numbered steps: 
1. God must know what it's like to have evil desires. [Implication of 
God's omniscience] 
2. Such knowledge requires (at some time) having an evil desire. 
[Application of empiricism to knowing what it's like to have evil 
desires] 
3. God couldn't have an evil desire. [Implication of God's moral 
perfection] 
4. Therefore, God couldn't know what it's like to have evil desires. 
[From 2 and 3] 
5. Therefore, God doesn't exist. [From 1 and 4] 
II. The Nagel-Jackson Arguments and Empiricism 
The core idea of the two anti-theistic arguments is that God's onmiscience 
would require His having mental states that are excluded by His other 
attributes. Underlying that idea is a form of empiricism that Blumenfeld 
describes as "evident" (1978, p. 204). Further, the empiricism may seem to 
gain support from widely discussed arguments by Nagel and Jackson, as 
I'll now explain. 
Consider the famous case of Mary, which Jackson uses in his 
Knowledge Argument against physicalism. Mary is a brilliant scientist 
who spends her life in a black-and-white room watching lectures on black-
and-white television. She thereby learns the completed science of human 
color vision. Then she leaves the room and has color experiences for the 
first time. Intuitively, when she leaves the room, she learns something: she 
learns what it's like to see in color. 
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There has been much discussion of what to make of Mary's alleged gain 
in knowledge. Some argue that she gains no informatio1l, but rather abilities 
(Nemirow 1980, Lewis 1988, Mellor 1993) or acquaintance-knowledge 
(Conee 1994). Others argue that she gains no new information but only new 
ways to represent information she already knew (Churchland 1985, Tye 
1986, Loar 1990, Lycan 1990, Pereboom 1994). Finally, others concede that 
she gains new information, but question Jackson's claim that if she gains 
new information then physicalism is false (Horgan 1984, Flanagan 1992, 
Searle 1992, Alter 1998). 
We needn't settle these disputes. The relevant claim for us is one that 
most concede and I'll grant for the sake of argument: that when Mary leaves 
the room, she learns what it's like to see in color.s That claim may seem to 
entail that one must have color experiences to know what they're like. 
Jackson writes, "Clearly the same style of Knowledge argument could 
be deployed for taste, hearing, the bodily sensations and generally speak-
ing for the various mental states which are said to have (as it is variously 
put) raw feels, phenomenal features or qualia" (1982, p. 130). That claim is 
plausible. For auditory experiences, we can replace the black-and-white 
room with a silent room; for olfactory experiences, an odorless room; for 
pain, a pain-free environment; and so on. The resulting arguments have 
the same persuasive force as the argument based on the Mary case. Nagel's 
(1974) discussion of bat-echolocation experiences may seem to suggest a 
similar result. He argues that the bat's experiences are so alien to us that 
we can't imagine what it's like to be such a creature. Some take that point 
to show that having bat-echolocation experiences is required for under-
standing what it's like to have such experiences, or for understanding the 
relevant concepts." 
Fear, frustration, despair, and evil desires involve qualia (or so I'll 
assume for the sake of argument). Therefore, the epistemic moral of the 
Nagel-Jackson arguments may seem to extend to those mental states. We 
can imagine a Mary-counterpart who, for example, learns everything one 
can learn about fear without experiencing fear. Were she then to experi-
ence fear, wouldn't she learn something, just as Mary learns something 
about color experiences when she leaves the black-and-white room? And 
wouldn't parallel reasoning apply to frustration, despair, and evil desires? 
If so, this would confirm the empiricism that drives the two anti-theistic 
arguments; understanding fear, frustration, despair, and what it's like to 
have an evil desire seems to require having those mental states. 
III. Three Objections 
In this section I'll present three objections to the empiricism driving the 
two anti-theistic arguments, i.e., to premise 2 of each. First, however, let me 
clarify one issue about the terms of the debate. 
One might wonder whether failing to understand the feelings associat-
ed with the concepts of fear, etc., are really defects for a maximally great 
being. Perhaps God's omniscience should be construed in a way that does-
n't entail knowing exactly how each finite creature subjectively feels. After 
all, lacking such knowledge wouldn't necessarily prevent God from identi-
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fying which creatures experience fear and which don't. At issue here, how-
ever, is the Anselmian conception on which God is omniscient in an unre-
stricted sense: by definition, such a God must know the nature of the feel-
ings in question, since there's manifestly something there to be known. 
Whether there are better conceptions of God, on which God need not know 
exactly how each finite creature feels, is beside the point. (Whether the tra-
ditional conception is really Anselm's is also beside the point.) 
Objection 1. Consider silent prayer. If God exists, then presumably God has 
direct cognitive access to the minds of those who pray. Suppose someone 
reflects vividly on her own fears and evil desires, and prays to God to help 
her rid herself of them. Why couldn't God perceive accurately what that 
person is feeling? Perhaps we can know about the feelings of others only 
through inferences from observations of their behavior (or observations of 
their brain activity, if we knew enough about neurobiology). But God's 
access to our mental states need not be similarly limited. There may be rea-
son to doubt that God could be afraid or have evil desires. But I see no rea-
son to doubt that God could directly perceive the contents of human con-
sciousness-by telepathy. 
Michael Beaty and Charles Taliaferro (1990) criticize Blumenfeld's argu-
ment on grounds similar to mine. They rightly ask, "Why could not God 
fully appreciate despair, fear, et aI., without being in those states by experi-
encing directly or indirectly the despair and fear of creatures like us?" 
(1990, p. 100). However, they present the objection reluctantly (and in pass-
ing). They explain the basis for their reluctance as follows: "It would be 
odd to suppose God qua omniscient being did not fully grasp fear until 
some creature was afraid and God had experienced her fear" (1990, p. 100). 
Their concern isn't, I take it, that God must wait for some creature to be 
afraid in order to fully grasp fear; God could create frightened creatures 
anytime God wants to. Their concern is rather that experiencing fear takes 
time, and so God would fail to understand fear before the first creature's 
experience of fear was complete. That's a genuine problem; that there 
should be a time at which God fails to know something is inconsistent with 
God's existence (given the traditional Anselmian conception). 
Yet God might have created a creature experiencing fear at the instant 
the universe began. (If there was no such instant, then we may suppose 
that there were always creatures undergoing such experiences.) God 
would have been able to perceive the first instant of that creature's experi-
ence. Perhaps in that same instant God deduced what it's like to experience 
ordinary (non-instantaneous) fear. If so, then there wouldn't have been a 
time before which God failed to understand fear. 
Blumenfeld might respond by disputing the possibility of deducing the 
nature of ordinary fear based on perceiving the first instant of the experi-
ence. I see no compelling grounds for doubting that possibility, but per-
haps such a response is defensible.' Even so, that such a defense is needed 
shows something important: the problem Blumenfeld raises isn't restricted 
to knowledge of fear, despair, etc.-experiences that seem incompatible 
with possessing the Anselrnian divine attributes. Rather, the problem is to 
explain how God could understand anything that requires experience to 
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understand. The problem could be formulated equally well in terms of 
love, which God could presumably experience. If understanding fear 
requires experiencing fear, then understanding love requires experiencing 
love. But love takes time if fear does, and so we have the same problem: 
before anyone (including God) experiences love, isn't God's knowledge 
incomplete? So, objection 1 accomplishes at least one thing: it reveals that 
there's no special problem for His understanding experiences that contra-
dict His omnipotence or moral perfection.8 
Objection 2. Even if God were not directly acquainted with fear, frustration, 
despair, and evil desires, He might be acquainted with their components, 
such as the qualia that tend to accompany (or partly constitute) those men-
tal states. If so, then He could deduce what it would be like to combine 
those components into states of fear, frustration, despair, and evil desires, 
without becoming afraid, frustrated, or desperate, and without having evil 
desires. Such a deduction would provide Him with the knowledge that 
Blumenfeld and the advocate of the argument from evil desires claim He 
couldn't have. 
Let me put the point in a slightly different way. Nagel writes, "Our own 
experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is 
therefore limited" (1974, p. 169). Here Nagel is referring to human imagi-
nation, and one may reasonably doubt that his claim generalizes to super-
natural beings like God. But let's put such doubts aside and assume that 
His imagination is limited by the material provided by His experience. 
Even so, I see no good grounds for denying that He could have experi-
ences that would provide the requisite material for imagining fear, frustra-
tion, despair, and having evil desires. 
This objection applies most forcefully to the argument from evil desires. 
Let's reconsider the case of evil desires, in connection to a variation of 
Jackson'S Mary case. Suppose that John never has an evil desire. He learns 
everything that can be learned about evil desires without having them, 
including the completed science of human emotions. Then he has evil 
desires for the first time-an event I'll call his corruption. At the time of his 
corruption, does he learn what it's like to have evil desiresr 
I doubt it. Perhaps desires have phenomenal features that distinguish 
them from beliefs, intentions, and other mental states. But the pre-corrupt 
John has non-evil desires-desires that are consistent with moral perfection. 
So, he's familiar with the phenomenal features of desiring; he knows what 
it's like to have a desire. And it seems doubtful that evil desires have dis-
tinctive phenomenal features-phenomenal features that distinguish them 
from non-evil desires. If evil desires lack such distinctive features, then, 
since the pre-corrupt John knows everything about non-evil desires, there's 
nothing about what it's like to have evil desires that he fails to know. 
Suppose, however, that there were some phenomenal feature E that all 
evil desires have and all non-evil desires lack. It's hard to see how E could 
be anything more than a way of telling whether a given desire is evil or not. 
In particular, it's doubtful that possessing E could be what makes a desire 
evil. What makes a desire evil is its content, or the combination of its con-
tent and the circumstances (broadly construed) in which one possesses it. 
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For example, there may be nothing evil in wanting Smith to die soon, if 
Smith is known to be suffering unbearable, incapacitating pain that will 
only get worse. A desire with the same propositional content (that Smith 
die soon) might be evil if the agent has malicious reasons for wanting 
Smith to die soon. Such factors, and not how a desire feels subjectively, 
determine whether a given desire is evil. 
Consider another example: the evil desire that all innocent children 
should be tortured. There is, I'll assume, something it's like to have that 
particular desire. Having a similar desire doesn't feel the same as having 
that particular desire. Nor does believing that all innocent children should 
be tortured feel the same as desiring that same state of affairs. But I see no 
reason why the pre-corrupt John wouldn't be able to deduce what it's like 
to have the desire in question, based solely on the knowledge he possesses. 
He would understand the propositional content of the relevant desire. 
And, again, he knows what it's like to have a desire. Therefore, he should 
be able to combine those two items of knowledge and thereby come to 
understand what it's like to have the desire in question. 
Thus, the empiricist principle on which the argument from evil desires 
relies gains no support from the Nagel-Jackson arguments. On the con-
trary, close scrutiny of the evil-desire counterpart of the Mary case reveals 
problems with that principle. While it's plausible that color experiences 
have phenomenal features the nature of which can't be deduced from 
Mary's pre-release knowledge, evil desires don't have phenomenal fea-
tures the nature of which can't be deduced from John's pre-corruption 
knowledge. Thus, even if a morally perfect being couldn't directly perceive 
the evil desires of human beings, the argument from evil desires fails.lO 
I said earlier that objection 2 applies most forcefully to the argument from 
evil desires. It may also undermine Blumenfeld's argument, concerning fear, 
frustration, and despair. But there's an important difference: while evil 
desires are analyzable into components that God would understand, the par-
allel point about fear, frustration, and despair is less obvious. Therefore, I 
can't conclude with confidence that objection 2 undermines Blumenfeld's 
argument, in addition to the argument from evil desires. 
Objection 3. I've been emphasizing the possibility of God's understanding the 
concepts of fear, frustration, and despair, and what it's like to have an evil 
desire by having experiences that are consistent with His omnipotence and 
moral perfection. But there's reason to doubt that such understanding 
requires having any particular sort of experience. One might have false 
memory traces of seeing red, which may be sufficient for knowing what it's 
like to see red. Jackson makes this point clearly in a recent article: 
Seeing red and feeling pain impact on us, leaving a memory trace 
which sustains our knowledge of what it's like to see red and feel 
pain on the many occasions where we are neither seeing red nor feel-
ing pain. This is why it was always a mistake to say that someone 
could not know what seeing red and feeling pain [are] like unless 
they had actually experienced them: false 'memory' traces are 
enough. (Jackson 1998, p. 77) 
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The same point applies to fear, frustration, despair, and having evil desires. 
Having false memory traces of those states may (other things being equal) 
be sufficient for understanding them. And having such traces doesn't con-
flict with omnipotence, moral perfection, or omniscience (since God may 
know that the memory traces aren't genuine). Therefore, God could under-
stand the states that He couldn't have independently of having any experi-
ences. 
Let me explain. Although I'm not presently perceiving anything red, I 
presently understand what it's like to see red. Why? Because I have the rel-
evant memory traces in my brain. Such memory traces might be present in 
my brain even if they don't originate in experiences of seeing red. Suppose 
that I've never seen red, but last night while I was asleep a neurosurgeon 
operated on my brain. As a result, my brain is in a state it would have been 
in had I seen red many times (and it functions normally in all other rele-
vant respects). What the neurosurgeon gave me is an example of a false 
memory trace. Thus, false memory traces are just like true memory traces, 
except that the "remembered" events didn't actually happen (at least, the 
events didn't happen to the person with the false memory traces). In my 
case, the trace doesn't derive causally from experiences of seeing red. 
On Jackson's view, having such false memory traces would suffice for 
knowing what it's like to see red. Thus, in order to learn what it's like to 
see red, Mary needn't have color experiences: she might instead have neu-
rosurgery in which she's given false memory traces. Likewise, one needn't 
have experienced fear in order to understand fear, because one might have 
a false memory trace of fear. If that's correct, then a human being can pos-
sess the relevant knowledge-that which is known to those who under-
stand what it's like to experience fear-in a form that doesn't require expe-
riencing fear. If so, then presumably God can, too. Thus, He could under-
stand fear without experiencing fear. In the case of God, the label "false 
memory trace" is potentially misleading, since He would be fully aware 
that the relevant "memories" don't trace back to fear experiences. But the 
label is unimportant. The key idea is that phenomenal knowledge can be 
possessed in a way that doesn't require the possessor to have had the cor-
responding experiences, even though those who possess such knowledge 
typically have had the corresponding experiences. Again, if such a thing is 
possible for humans, then presumably it's possible for God. 
IV. Conclusion 
Before summarizing, let me briefly address a general concern. In present-
ing objections 1-3, I described God as perceiving, imagining, etc. One may 
wonder whether divine cognition is similar enough to human cognition to 
warrant such attributions. Perhaps divine cognition is so different from the 
forms of thought with which we're familiar that such descriptions are 
grossly inaccurate. But the empiricism driving the two anti-theistic argu-
ments has no plausibility without the assumption that God's mind is to 
some degree similar to familiar minds-similar enough to warrant describ-
ing Him as imagining, perceiving, etc. If we reject that assumption, then 
the anti-theistic arguments don't get off the grOlllld. So, it would be unrea-
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sonable for my opponents to dismiss my objections on the grounds that 
they assume too much similarity between human and divine cognition. For 
what I assume, they assume too. 
Blumenfeld claims to have demonstrated a conflict between omni-
science and omnipotence, and the argument from evil desires claims to 
establish a conflict between omniscience and moral perfection. I presented 
three objections. First, I argued that He could understand the mental 
states in question by telepathically perceiving the minds of imperfect crea-
tures like us. Second, I argued that God could know what it's like to have 
evil desires by imaginatively combining their components. Similar imagi-
native combination might also enable Him to understand the concepts of 
fear, frustration, and despair. Finally, I argued that false memory traces 
might enable Him to comprehend fear, frustration, despair, and evil 
desires. 
Objection 1 turned out to depend on the claim that God could instanta-
neously deduce how fear, etc., feel from an instantaneous perception of 
such experiences. Even if that claim is false, the objection reveals that 
there's no special problem for His understanding experiences He can't 
have; the same problem arises for understanding emotions that aren't 
ruled out by the divine attributes. The second and third objections are less 
problematic than the first, although the second may undermine only the 
argument from evil desires and not Blumenfeld's argument. Taken togeth-
er, the three arguments have at least enough strength to shift the burden of 
proof on those who wish to defend Blumenfeld's argument or the argu-
ment from evil desires. ll • 12 
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NOTES 
1. Hestevold (N.D.) presents an argument along these lines. I should note 
that his version (i) was developed independently of Blumenfeld's argument, 
(ii) differs (at least in presentation) from the version I consider here, and (iii) 
therefore may not be subject to my criticisms. 
2. My use of the masculine pronoun for God is not meant to suggest that 
God is a sexed or gendered being. While God is a personal being, there are a 
number of important debates about how to tlunk about the use of our finite 
human language to refer to God. 
3. Blumenfeld's inference relies on the tacit assumption that God couldn't 
believe something He knows to be false, even through an act of will. That 
assumption is plausible but not trivial. 
4. So formulated, the argument from evil desires doesn't concern under-
standing mental-state concepts, but rather knowing what it's like to have a certain 
sort of mental state. But Blumenfeld also uses the "knowing what it's like" ter-
minology. The passage I quoted above from pages 206-7 of hls article continues 
as follows: "Furthermore, a person who has not undergone these states vlOuld-
n't know what it's like to experience them. Consequently he wouldn't have a 
full understanding of fear, frustration, and despair. A man who had never experi-
enced fear, for example, would lack a complete comprehension of fear, just as a 
man who was blind from birth would lack a full grasp of the sensation of red." 
5. Some deny that claim. See, for example, Dennett (1991). Jackson (1998) 
now rejects the knowledge argument. I will ignore that fact. 
6. Nagel implies that, among bats, only the microchiroptera rely on echolo-
cation (1974, p. 168). That isn't quite right. Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff note 
that the bats that use echolocation include "about 30 species from the genus 
Rousettus in the suborder Megachiroptera, and all of the approximately 660 
species in the suborder Microchiroptera . .. " (1997, p. 155). Bats echolocate in at 
least three different ways: constant frequency, frequency sweep, and short 
burst. Therefore, as Allen and Bekoff conclude, "Presumably there is no one 
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thing it is 'like to be a bat: any more than there is one thing it is 'like to be a pri-
mate.'" Obviously, these details don't undermine Nagel's philosophical claims. 
7. Also, the line of argument I've suggested isn't available to those who 
hold (e.g. on biblical grounds) that God didn't create a fearful creature at the 
instant the universe began. 
8. Beaty and Taliaferro argue that, "".God knows the concept of fear, not 
because God experiences fear, either in itself or in some other fearful creature, 
but because God is the causal author of all concepts, including the concept of 
fear" (1990, p. 104). However, they never explain how being the "causal author 
of all concepts" would provide God with a full understanding of the concepts 
He authors. On the face of it, one could be causally responsible for the exis-
tence of a concept and yet fail to tmderstand all of its dimensions, just as one 
could be causally responsible for the existence of a theory or artifact without 
completely understanding the nature of that theory or artifact. Further, Beaty 
and Taliaferro seem to assume that God first created the concept of fear and 
only then created experiences of fear. But that assumption isn't obviously true, 
and it isn't clear that they are entitled to it in the context of criticizing 
Blumenfeld's argument. I should remark, however, that I am generally sympa-
thetic with Beaty and Taliaferro's paper, and that the majority of their argu-
ments compliment those I make here. 
9. I assume that the very idea of an evil desire is coherent. If not, then the 
argument from evil desires doesn't get off the ground. 
10. This point wouldn't comfort those who believe that God can't have 
desires, whether non-evil or evil. Likewise, my first objection would be unac-
ceptable to those who deny that He is capable of anything like sensory experi-
ence (because, for example, He is immutable or atemporal). But whether God 
can have desires or sensory experience is a topic for another occasion. 
11. Blumenfeld discusses a variety of objections to his argument, but he fails 
to consider those I've raised. He does consider the objection that God could 
understand fear, frustration, and despair by drawing analogies from experiences 
that are consistent with His omnipotence and omniscience (1978, pp. 209-211). 
He finds such analogical reasoning unsatisfactory. But my first objection was 
that He could understand the concepts of fear, frustration, and despair, not by 
analogy, but by direct acquaintance with the experiences of human beings. And 
my second objection was that He could tmderstand the mental states in question 
by deducing their nature from their components. I see no reason why the deduc-
tion would have to involve analogical reasoning, except in the broad sense 
described in the first paragraph of section IV. Thus, Blumenfeld's misgivings 
about analogical reasoning don't seem to undermine my first two objections. 
Nothing he says in his article addresses my third objection. 
12. This paper began as a response to H. Scott Hestevold's interesting 
paper on the topic. I'm indebted to him for kindly showing me his paper and 
for helpful discussions. I also thank Stuart Rachels for excellent criticisms on 
multiple drafts. Finally, I thank Editor William Hasker and two anonymous 
referees from Faith and Philosophy for helpful criticisms. 
